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Even within a single knowledge representation system there are often many different
ways to model a given domain and formalise a reasoning problem speciﬁed over the
domain. In particular, two knowledge descriptions can be semantically equivalent even
if they are expressed in quite different languages or vocabularies. This paper proposes
and studies a concept of synonymy that applies to equivalent theories formulated in
distinct vocabularies. We suggest a set of general desiderata or criteria of adequacy that
any reasonable synonymy concept should satisfy. We then analyse a speciﬁc concept of
synonymy within answer set programming (ASP), a framework that is currently being
applied with success in many areas of knowledge technology. We characterise this concept
in different ways, show that it satisﬁes the prescribed criteria of adequacy, and illustrate
how it can be applied to a sample problem arising in knowledge representation and
reasoning. As a logical framework we use quantiﬁed equilibrium logic based on a ﬁrst-
order version of the logic of here-and-there. This serves as an adequate formal foundation
for ASP and allows us to obtain a logical account of the synonymy relation.
© 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
This paper is about how different descriptions of a piece of knowledge may be equivalent even if they are expressed
in different vocabularies or signatures. It is a type of problem that arises in many disciplines. In logic and the foundations
of mathematics one can formalise the idea that mathematical theories, say from algebra, geometry, number theory or set
theory, can be presented in various ways using different primitive concepts. In the philosophy of science one is often in-
terested in how equivalent scientiﬁc concepts can arise from apparently different theories, how one and the same theory
might be expressed or logically reconstructed in distinct ways, or how, as in wave-particle duality in physics, apparently
alternative or even rival descriptions of knowledge might actually be partly or fully equivalent. In software engineering one
may be faced with the problem of transforming a piece of code written in one programming language into “equivalent”
code written in a completely different language. More generally, compiler design faces this task in a systematic fashion. In
highly distributed, multi-agent systems, agreement technologies may be needed to determine when agents are using differ-
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merging of ontologies. In general one cannot assume that, even within a single domain, different ontologies will use the
same vocabulary, so the merging task needs to isolate parts or sub-ontologies that while differently expressed are actually
equivalent. Similar problems arise in other areas of knowledge-based reasoning such as machine learning, AI planning or
causal theories of action where it can be important to know whether two knowledge descriptions are essentially different
or whether they are merely linguistic variants of basically the same thing. In these areas, several of the example types we
encounter arise in practice as a result of changing to a new representation on certain pragmatic grounds like eﬃciency,
while aiming to preserve meaning.
1.1. Focus of the paper
Our work will focus on the area of knowledge technologies and on the equivalence of knowledge descriptions formalised
in different vocabularies. Knowledge descriptions will be viewed simply as theories in the usual syntax of ﬁrst-order logic.
The underlying representation framework will be that of answer set programming (ASP), interpreted in a standard way us-
ing quantiﬁed equilibrium logic [1,2]. Since the underlying logic will be ﬁxed throughout, our work does not make contact
with studies of embedding relations between different nonmonotonic logics, such as in [3]. Our focus is rather on relating
different conceptual schemes within one logical framework. While ASP has been developed as a formalism for logic pro-
grams viewed as sets of nonmonotonic rules, the basic semantics has now been extended to arbitrary ﬁrst-order theories
and many enrichments of the language of normal and disjunctive programs have been implemented. Although answer set
solvers may use different programming dialects and apply a variety of special constructions, like weight constraints, cardi-
nality constraints and aggregates, they share a similar underlying semantics and the special constructions can be interpreted
in the full ﬁrst-order syntax. In this way our approach should be widely applicable across different ASP systems.
1.2. General answer set programs and equilibrium logic
Answer set programming is now a well established approach to knowledge representation and declarative problem solv-
ing in many application domains. This is largely thanks to the development of practical and eﬃcient solvers such as DLV [4],
GnT [5], smodels [6], Cmodels4, ASSAT5, CLASP6, ASPeRIX7 and others. AI applications include planning and diagnosis, as
exempliﬁed in a prototype decision support system for the space shuttle [7], the management of heterogeneous data in
information systems, as performed in the INFOMIX project,8 the representation of ontologies in the semantic web allowing
for default knowledge and inference, as discussed in [8], as well as compact and fully declarative representations of hard
combinatorial problems such as n-Queens, Hamiltonian paths, Towers of Hanoi, and so on.9
In order to analyse problems of equivalence and synonymy in ASP we shall use Quantiﬁed Equilibrium Logic (QEL) as
developed in [10–12]. QEL serves as an adequate logical foundation for answer set programs with variables but it also
permits a straightforward deﬁnition of answer set (or equilibrium model) for arbitrary theories in ﬁrst-order logic. The
(monotonic) logical basis for QEL is the non-classical logic of Quantiﬁed Here-and-There, QHT (see also [1]). By expanding
the language to include new predicates, this logic can be embedded in classical ﬁrst-order logic [2], and this permits an
alternative but equivalent formulation of the concept of answer set for ﬁrst-order formulas, expressed in terms of classical,
second-order logic [13]. The latter deﬁnition of answer set has been further studied in [14,15] where the basis of a ﬁrst-
order programming language, RASPL-1, is described. An alternative approach to a ﬁrst-order ASP language is developed
in [16].
There are several advantages to treating full ﬁrst-order theories in QEL. First, this logic captures all the usual semantics
for different ASP dialects. Using the full ﬁrst-order syntax it is also adequate for all the standard constructions such as
cardinality constraints and aggregates. In addition, we don’t have to regard explicit deﬁnitions (the cornerstone of our
synonymy concept) as special constructions or as meta-level devices: by having a rich enough syntax they become ordinary
object language expressions.
1.3. Some motivating examples
Let us consider some examples arising out of different areas of knowledge representation, including planning, causal
action theory, and combinatorial problem solving.
3 See the European COST Action IC0801 Agreement Technologies, http://www.agreement-technologies.eu and the Spanish research project of the same
name: http://www.agreement-technologies.org.
4 http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/tag/cmodels/.
5 http://assat.cs.ust.hk/.
6 http://www.cs.uni-potsdam.de/clasp/.
7 http://www.info.univ-angers.fr/pub/claire/asperix/.
8 http://sv.mat.unical.it/infomix/.
9 For these kinds of examples as well as a thorough introduction to ASP, see [9]. See also the ASP benchmarks available at http://www.cs.kuleuven.be/
~dtai/events/ASP-competition/index.shtml.
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an n-place predicate into several predicates of smaller arity. For instance, instead of using the predicate
move(x, y, z, i)
to say that x is moved from y to z at time i, they use three predicates
object(x, i)∧ source(y, i)∧ destination(z, i).
In this case the practical concern is to speed up search. Similar examples of relational splitting occur in areas of machine
learning.
2. Action attribute symbols in causal action theories [18]. The use of action attributes is very similar to the ﬁrst case, but
now the aim is to improve elaboration tolerance; i.e. to make the theory easier to modify when new objects and new
scenarios are introduced. In the famous problem of missionaries and cannibals, instead of cross(V , L) for V a vessel,
and L a location, one writes
cross_in(V ), cross_to(L).
In [18], Lifschitz analyses in the Causal Calculator many of the 19 variants of the missionaries and cannibals problem
proposed by McCarthy. Using action attribute symbols he is able to show how each new scenario can be dealt with
merely by the addition of new postulates.
3. Dual representations. Sometimes quite different representations of a problem come about because of a slight change of
viewpoint. A relatively common example arises in Knowledge Representation when dealing with puzzle-like scenarios
such as chess, 8-queens, n-puzzle, etc., where we have a board or an array and a set of possibly different pieces or tiles.
In these cases we can choose different representations that are in a sense dual to each other. For instance, considering
the 8-puzzle, we can represent each tile T as a “main object” and its row X and column Y in the board as its attributes,
so that we could have ﬂuents like row(T , X) and column(T , Y ) that vary over time. A dual representation could consider
instead each board cell (identiﬁed by the pair (X, Y )) as the main object, and its content as an attribute, so we would
have a ﬂuent like content(X, Y , T ). Actions may also have dual representations. For instance, in the same example and
assuming that tiles are the main objects, we could decide to shift a tile T that is next to the empty position (the hole)
so we have an action move_tile(T , D) in some direction ∈ {up,down, right, left}, or we could see the movement as a shift
of the hole itself in the opposite direction with an action move_hole(D ′), assuming that the hole is unique.
4. Reiﬁcation. In another example involving causal theories of action [19] Balduccini and Gelfond propose an architecture
for a software agent that operates a physical device and is capable of monitoring, testing and repairing the device’s
components. They build a program to ﬁnd candidate diagnoses using answer set programming. The problem is to com-
pare two different but apparently equivalent ways to manage the preconditions of a law, one using lists (not available
in most ASP implementations) and one without. The problem is described in detail in Section 6 below.
5. Quantiﬁer elimination by introduction of auxiliary predicates. The standard ASP languages do not currently allow one to
formulate rules containing explicit quantiﬁers within their bodies. However, as Cabalar [20] and Lee and Palla [21] have
recently discussed, the use of existential quantiﬁers in rule bodies can lead to a more compact and intuitive modelling
of a problem. For instance, as Cabalar mentions, in ASP one might formulate a typical default law of inertia arising in
knowledge representation by means of these rules:
holds
(
F , V ,do(A, S)
) ← holds(F , V , S), not ab(F , V , A, S), (1)
ab(F , V , A, S) ← holds(F ,W ,do(A, S)), W = V (2)
where V , W are potential values for a ﬂuent F , and A and S range over actions and situations, respectively. The
predicate ab is an auxiliary expression used to specify that there is some value of F different from V . In other words
one could use the following, more succinct formulation:
holds
(
F , V ,do(A, S)
) ← holds(F , V , S),
not ∃W (holds(F ,W ,do(A, S)),W = V ) (3)
removing the need for the predicate ab. An ASP semantics for such a use of existential quantiﬁcation is readily given
in equilibrium logic or within the general theory of stable models. Cabalar in [20] describes a general method for
replacing these quantiﬁers by auxiliary predicates leading to rules that can be accepted by current ASP solvers.10 The
main problem is to show that the two representations are equivalent.
10 A similar technique has been implemented in [21].
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Our aim is to capture a concept of synonymy, or equivalence, for theories formulated in different vocabularies or signa-
tures in the language of ASP. The framework we propose should be able to handle the kinds of intertheoretic equivalences
arising in the above examples from knowledge representation and declarative problem solving. By using a logical recon-
struction in QHT and equilibrium logic, we assume that there is single underlying logical language for ASP. Nevertheless,
as we shall see from examples, we can also treat cases where differences of vocabulary arise partly out of differences in
the underlying programming syntax of different ASP implementations. There are also many specialised languages built on
top of ASP systems, such as the action language A, or the planning language K based on the DLV system. Again, as long
as we know how to interpret these higher-level languages into basic answer set semantics, there should be no diﬃculty in
treating problems of synonymy and equivalence for theories within or even across these special languages.
An important property of our concept of synonymy is that it should be robust under theory extensions. This is not
a self-evident feature of equivalence concepts in nonmonotonic reasoning, where we do not have the usual replacement
theorems. Let us consider the case of two theories formulated in the same vocabulary. They may have the same answer sets
yet behave very differently once they are embedded in some larger context. For a robust or modular notion of equivalence
one should require that programs behave similarly when extended by any further programs. This leads to the following
concept of strong equivalence: programs Π1 and Π2 are strongly equivalent, in symbols Π1 ≡s Π2, if and only if for any
Σ , Π1 ∪ Σ is equivalent to (has the same answer sets as) Π2 ∪ Σ . This has been recognised as providing an important
conceptual and practical tool for program simpliﬁcation, transformation and optimisation. Following its initial study in [22],
the concept of strong equivalence for logic programs in ASP has given rise to a substantial body of further work looking
at different characterisations [23,24], new variations and applications of the idea [25–27], as well as developing systems to
test for strong equivalence [26,28]. Recently, some of this work on program transformation [29,30] has been extended to
the ﬁrst-order case. While strong equivalence and some related concepts are indeed robust, it is assumed that the programs
being compared are formulated in the same vocabulary, or at least that any differences of vocabulary are semantically
unimportant.11
As we can see from the kinds of examples mentioned in the previous section, this assumption is quite restrictive and not
always realistic. It means that until now no systematic tools have been developed to check whether different representations
are really semantically equivalent when they are intended to be.
While our technical characterisations of synonymy are speciﬁc to the framework of answer set programming, our general
approach should be more widely applicable to other KRR and nonmonotonic formalisms. This is true in particular of the
general criteria of adequacy that we propose for a synonymy concept. Even our speciﬁc methods, based on the theory of
interpretations and Beth’s Theorem, may be re-usable for other formalisms, if their underlying logics permit. These methods
are adaptations of techniques already used in classical logic that cover examples from mathematics, as well as empirical
theories from the natural or social sciences.
1.5. Outline and main results
We start following [31] by considering formal and informal desiderata that a concept of synonymy should fulﬁl. In
Section 3 we then review quantiﬁed equilibrium logic and its relation to answer set semantics. We present the main
characterisation of strong equivalence from [1]. In Section 4 we discuss the deﬁnability of concepts and interpretability
between theories. In Section 5 we turn to our main question, how to deﬁne a strong concept of equivalence or synonymy
for theories in quantiﬁed equilibrium logic. We give different characterisations of this concept and show that it fulﬁls the
adequacy conditions discussed in Section 2. The main characteristics of this concept are as follows. Theories Π1 and Π2 in
distinct languages are said to be synonymous if each is bijectively interpretable in the other. In particular, this means that
there is faithful interpretation of each theory in the other and a one-one correspondence between the models of the two
theories. This correspondence preserves the property of being an equilibrium model or answer set. In addition, Π1 has a
deﬁnitional extension that is strongly equivalent to a deﬁnitional extension of Π2. Moreover, in a suitable sense, Π1 and Π2
remain equivalent or synonymous when extended by the addition of new formulas.
As an illustration of our framework, in Section 6 we treat in detail an example from causal action theory applied to
diagnostic problems. Section 7 discusses some further aspects of synonymy, while Section 8 reviews literature and related
work. Conclusions are drawn in Section 9.
2. Synonymous theories
What does it mean to say that two theories, Π1 and Π2, in different languages or signatures, L1 and L2, are synony-
mous? We consider six desiderata D1–D6 that we believe should be satisﬁed by any basic concept of synonymy. They are
quite general and should be applicable to any theories describing or modelling some knowledge domain; notice that D4
takes account of the special nature of a nonmonotonic knowledge representation and reasoning system.
11 The assumption is partly relaxed in the case of projective equivalence, where only a part of the vocabulary is assumed to be common to two theo-
ries [30]. But then equivalence is only analysed with respect to this shared component.
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translation τ should uniformly reﬂect the structure of the source language, so we require it to be recursive.
D2. Semantic correspondence. There should be a corresponding correlation between the structures of L1 and L2, in par-
ticular a mapping Φ from L2-structures to L1-structures that respects the translation τ in the sense that for any
L2-structure I and L1-formula ϕ ,
Φ(I) | ϕ ⇔ I | τ (ϕ).
D3. Equivalence. Given the syntactic correlation between their languages, Π1 and Π2 should be in a strong sense equivalent.
D4. Intended models. The semantic correlation should respect the intended or preferred models of the two theories. In the
present case this means preserving the property of being an equilibrium model or answer set: M is an answer set of
Π2 iff Φ(M) is an answer set of Π1.
D5. Symmetry. If Π1 is synonymous with Π2 under the previous mappings, then under corresponding mappings Π2 should
be synonymous with Π1. In general we expect synonymy to be an equivalence relation.
D6. Robustness. Π1 and Π2 should remain synonymous under the addition of new formulas, in other words for any Σ ,
Π1 ∪Σ should be synonymous with Π2 ∪ τ (Σ), similarly for Π2 ∪Π .
The ﬁrst two conditions provide the cornerstone of any formal approach to intertheory relations. Different kinds of rela-
tions between theories are obtained by specifying additional conditions that the mappings should satisfy (see e.g. [32–34]).
In our case, the two languages use standard ﬁrst-order syntax in a non-classical underlying logic. So in our framework of
ASP, the L1,L2-structures are non-classical models for the logic of here-and-there. The remaining conditions express differ-
ent kinds of equivalence requirements. For example D4 is needed by the fact that our logical framework is nonmonotonic
and therefore special selected or minimal models are singled out. D5 expresses a key property of the synonymy relation,
and D6 ensures that synonymy satisﬁes certain modularity properties and is robust under theory extensions. With D3 we
express the idea that both theories should represent essentially the same knowledge. This informal requirement will be
made precise later on in Proposition 10.
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly we approach the problem of synonymy via an adaptation of the classical theory of in-
terpretations. Brieﬂy we shall say that theories are synonymous if each is faithfully and bijectively interpreted in the other;
this is basically the standard approach followed in classical predicate logic, see e.g. [35,36]. We adapt it here to the case of
a nonmonotonic system based on a non-classical logic.
3. Review of quantiﬁed equilibrium logic and answer set semantics
We assume the reader has some familiarity with the usual deﬁnition of stable model or answer set semantics for logic
programs [37] as well as the way in which answer sets can be used to encode and solve different kinds of reasoning prob-
lems [9]. As a logical framework for ASP we use the logic of here-and-there and its nonmonotonic extension (quantiﬁed)
equilibrium logic. For the propositional version of the logic HT of here-and-there and an overview of propositional equi-
librium logic, see [38]. Usually in quantiﬁed equilibrium logic we include a second, strong negation operator as occurs in
several ASP dialects. In this paper we shall restrict attention to the language with a single negation symbol, ‘¬’. In particular,
we shall work with a quantiﬁed version of the logic HT, with the usual logical constants ‘¬’, ‘∧’, ‘∨’, ‘→’, quantiﬁers ‘∀’, ‘∃’,
and the deﬁned constant ‘↔’. In other respects we follow the treatment of [12].
For the remainder of the paper we consider languages L = 〈C, F , P 〉, built over a set of constants, C , a set of functions,
F , and a set of predicates, P ; the three sets of symbols are disjoint and each predicate symbol and each function symbol
has an assigned arity. Atoms and formulas are constructed as usual; closed formulas, or sentences, are those where no variable
appears outside the scope of a quantiﬁer. A theory is a set of sentences. Variable-free terms, atoms, formulas, or theories
are also called ground.
We regard structures as sets of atoms built over arbitrary non-empty domains, D; we denote by At(D, F , P ) the set of
atomic sentences of 〈D, F , P 〉 (if D = C , we obtain the set of atomic sentence of the language L = 〈C, F , P 〉);12 and we
denote by T (D, F ) the set of ground terms of 〈D, F , P 〉. If L = 〈C, F , P 〉 and L′ = 〈C ′, F ′, P ′〉, we write L ⊆ L′ if C ⊆ C ′ ,
F ⊆ F ′ and P ⊆ P ′ .
By an L-interpretation over a set D we mean a subset of At(D, F , P ). A classical L-structure can be regarded as a tuple
I = 〈(D, I), I∗〉 where I∗ is an L-interpretation over D and I : T (C ∪ D, F ) → D , called the assignment, veriﬁes that I(d) = d
for all d ∈ D and is recursively deﬁned.13 If D = T (C, F ) and I = id, I is known as a Herbrand structure. On the other hand,
a here-and-there L-structure with static domains, or QHTs(L)-structure, is a tuple I = 〈(D, I), Ih, It〉 where 〈(D, I), Ih〉 and
〈(D, I), It〉 are classical L-structures such that Ih ⊆ It .
12 We can think of the objects in D as additional constants; this approach allow us to use a simpliﬁed notation where the objects are not distinguished
from their names.
13 That is, for every a ∈ C , I(a) ∈ D and for every f ∈ F with arity n, a mapping f I : Dn → D is deﬁned; so the recursive deﬁnition is given by
I( f (t1, . . . , tn)) = f I (I(t1), . . . , I(tn)).
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I|L =
〈
(D, I|L), Ih|L, It |L
〉
where: I|L is the restriction of the assignment I to the set of terms built with D and the constants and functions from L;
and, for w ∈ {h, t}, I w |L is obtained by removing from I w any atom with predicates, constants or functions in L′ which are
not in L.
Thus we can think of a here-and-there structure I as similar to a ﬁrst-order classical model, but having two parts, or
components, h and t that correspond to two different points or “worlds”, ‘here’ and ‘there’, in the sense of Kripke semantics
for intuitionistic logic [39], where the worlds are ordered by h < t . At each world w ∈ {h, t} one veriﬁes a set of atoms I w
in the expanded language for the domain D . We call the model static, since, in contrast, to say, intuitionistic logic, the same
domain serves each of the worlds. Since h < t , whatever is veriﬁed at h remains true at t . The satisfaction relation for I
is deﬁned so as to reﬂect the two different components, so we write I,w | ϕ to denote that ϕ is true in I with respect
to the w component. Although we only need to deﬁne the satisfaction relation in L = 〈C, F , P 〉, the recursive deﬁnition
forces us to consider formulas from 〈C ∪ D, F , P 〉. In particular, if p(t1, . . . , tn) ∈ At(C ∪ D, F , P ) then I,w | p(t1, . . . , tn) iff
p(I(t1), . . . , I(tn)) ∈ I w for every t1, . . . , tn ∈ T (C ∪ D, F ). Then | is extended recursively as follows14:
• I,w | ϕ ∧ψ iff I,w | ϕ and I,w | ψ .
• I,w | ϕ ∨ψ iff I,w | ϕ or I,w | ψ .
• I, t | ϕ → ψ iff I, t | ϕ or I, t | ψ .
• I,h | ϕ → ψ iff I, t | ϕ → ψ and I,h | ϕ or I,h | ψ .
• I,w | ¬ϕ iff I, t | ϕ .
• I, t | ∀xϕ(x) iff I, t | ϕ(d) for all d ∈ D .
• I,h | ∀xϕ(x) iff I, t | ∀xϕ(x) and I,h | ϕ(d) for all d ∈ D .
• I,w | ∃xϕ(x) iff I,w | ϕ(d) for some d ∈ D .
Truth of a sentence in a model is deﬁned as follows: I | ϕ iff I,w | ϕ for each w ∈ {h, t}. A sentence ϕ is valid if it is
true in all models, denoted by | ϕ . A sentence ϕ is a consequence of a set of sentences Π , denoted Π | ϕ , if every model
of Π is a model of ϕ .
The resulting logic is called Quantiﬁed Here-and-There Logic with static domains, and denoted in [1] by QHTs . In terms of
satisﬁability and validity this logic is equivalent to the logic introduced in [11].
A complete axiomatisation of QHTs can be obtained as follows [1]. We take the axioms and rules of ﬁrst-order intuition-
istic logic [39] and add the axiom of Hosoi [40]:
α ∨ (¬β ∨ (α → β))
which determines 2-element here-and-there models in the propositional case, together with the axiom:
∃x(α(x) → ∀xα(x)).
We also consider the equality predicate,
.=/∈ P , interpreted by the following condition for every w ∈ {h, t},
• I,w | t1 .= t2 iff I(t1) = I(t2).
To obtain a complete axiomatisation, we need to add the axiom of “decidable equality”
∀x∀y(x .= y ∨ x  .= y).
We denote the resulting logic by QHTs=(L) and its inference relation by . More details can be found in [1] where in
particular a strong completeness theorem is proved, that is: for any theory Γ and any formula ϕ , Γ  ϕ iff Γ | ϕ .
As usual in ﬁrst order logic, satisﬁability and validity are independent of the signature.
Proposition 1. Suppose that L′ ⊃ L, Π is a theory in L and M is an L′-model of Π . Then M|L is an L′-model of Π .
Proposition 2. Suppose that L′ ⊃ L and ϕ ∈ L. Then ϕ is valid (resp. satisﬁable) in QHTs=(L) if and only if it is valid (resp. satisﬁable)
in QHTs=(L′).
This proposition allows us to omit reference to the signature in the logic so it can be denoted simply by QHTs= .
14 The following corresponds to the usual Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic given our assumptions about the two worlds h and t and the single
domain D , see e.g. [39].
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models, we say that the parameter names assumption (PNA) applies in case I|T (C,F ) is surjective, i.e., there are no unnamed
individuals in D; the unique names assumption (UNA) applies in case I|T (C,F ) is injective; in case both the PNA and UNA
apply, the standard names assumption (SNA) applies, i.e. I|T (C,F ) is a bijection.
3.1. Equilibrium models
As in the propositional case, quantiﬁed equilibrium logic is based on a suitable notion of minimal model.
Deﬁnition 1. Among quantiﬁed here-and-there structures we deﬁne the order  as follows: 〈(D, I), Ih, It〉 〈(D ′, J ), J h, J t〉
if D = D ′ , I = J , It = J t and Ih ⊆ J h . If the subset relation holds strictly, we write ‘’.
Deﬁnition 2 (Equilibrium model). Let Π be a theory and I = 〈(D, I), Ih, It〉 a model of Π .
1. I is said to be total if Ih = It .
2. I is said to be an equilibrium model of Π (or short, we say: “I is in equilibrium”) if it is minimal under  among
models of Π , and it is total. It is denoted by I |∼Π .
Notice that a total here-and-there model of a theory Π is equivalent to a classical ﬁrst order model of Π .
The logic deﬁned by the equilibrium models is called Quantiﬁed Equilibrium Logic (QEL) and it is also independent of the
language, as seen by the following result.
Proposition 3. Let Π be a theory in L and M an equilibrium model of Π in QHTs=(L′) with L′ ⊃ L. Then M|L is an equilibrium
model of Π in QHTs=(L).
3.1.1. Relation to other deﬁnitions of answer set
We assume the reader is familiar with the usual deﬁnitions of answer set based on Herbrand models and ground pro-
grams, e.g. [9]. Two variations of this semantics, the open [16] and generalised open answer set [41] semantics, consider
non-ground programs and open domains, thereby relaxing the PNA.
For the present version of QEL the correspondence to answer sets can be summarised as follows (see [11,12,42]). If ϕ is
a universal sentence in L = 〈C, F , P 〉,15 a total QHTs= model 〈(D, I), T , T 〉 of ϕ is an equilibrium model of ϕ iff 〈T , T 〉 is a
propositional equilibrium model of the grounding of ϕ with respect to the universe U .
By the usual convention, when Π is a logic program with variables we consider the models of its universal closure
expressed as a set of logical formulas. It follows that if Π is a logic program (of any form), a total QHTs= model 〈(D, I), T , T 〉
of Π is an equilibrium model of Π iff it is a generalised open answer set of Π in the sense of [41]. If we assume all models
are UNA-models, we obtain the version of QEL found in [11]. There, the following relation of QEL to (ordinary) answer sets
for logic programs with variables was established. If Π is a logic program, a total UNA-QHTs= model 〈(D, I), T , T 〉 of Π is
an equilibrium model of Π iff it is an open answer set of Π .
In [13] a new deﬁnition of stable model for arbitrary ﬁrst-order formulas is provided, deﬁning the property of being a
stable model syntactically via a second-order condition. However [13] also shows that the new notion of stable model is
equivalent to that of equilibrium model deﬁned here. In a sequel to this paper, [14] applies the new deﬁnition and makes
the following reﬁnements. The stable models of a formula are deﬁned as in [13] while the answer sets of a formula are those
Herbrand models of the formula that are stable in the sense of [13]. Using this new terminology, it follows that in general
stable models and equilibrium models coincide, while answer sets are equivalent to SNA-QHTs= models that are equilibrium
models.
Since we capture a general notion of answer set for arbitrary ﬁrst-order theories, our framework of QHTs= and QEL is
widely applicable to knowledge representation problems reconstructed in different ASP languages. One area where there is
less uniformity is the treatment of functions in ASP. This is still an active area of theoretical research and there are different
approaches, e.g. [43–46]. The introduction of function symbols in ASP systems is still at an early stage and most current
solvers are not yet equipped with them. As we have seen, our approach here uses a rather classical notion of total function
with decidable equality. The techniques used below could however be adapted, if necessary, to other treatments of functions
in ASP.
3.2. Strong equivalence for theories
Before turning to the concept of synonymy in ASP, we review brieﬂy the notion of strong equivalence that captures a
robust form of equivalence for theories expressed in the same language.
15 I.e. a sentence in prenex form all of whose quantiﬁers are universal; see [11] for prenex forms in QHTs= .
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an important tool in ASP as a basis for program transformation and optimisation. We say that two sets Π1, Π2 of ﬁrst-order
sentences are strongly equivalent if for every set Σ of ﬁrst-order sentences, possibly of a larger signature, the sets Π1 ∪ Σ ,
Π2 ∪Σ have the same equilibrium models. Under this deﬁnition we have:
Theorem 1. (See [1,12].) Two (ﬁrst-order) theoriesΠ1 andΠ2 are strongly equivalent if and only if they have the same QHTs=-models.
By strong completeness, it follows that two theories Γ and  are strongly equivalent if and only if they are logically
equivalent in QHTs= .
The following results will be useful later when the concepts of deﬁnability and interpretation are introduced. In them,
we may assume that the formulas are in a suitable normal form, where functions only appear in atoms with equality and
without nesting. Here and in the remainder of the paper we use the following notation and terminology. Boldface x stands
for a tuple of variables, x = (x1, . . . , xn), while ϕ(x) = ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) is a formula whose free variables are x1, . . . , xn , and
∀x= ∀x1 . . .∀xn . If ti are terms, then t= (t1, . . . , tn) denotes a vector of terms.
Lemma 1. Let α(x) be an atomic formula containing the term f (t) where the terms in t do not contain the function symbol f ; and let
β(x, y) be the atomic formula obtained by replacing in α(x) the term f (t) by a fresh variable y. Then:
| ∀x(α(x) ↔ ∀y( f (t) .= y → β(x, y))).
If an atom in a formula of a theory or program is substituted by the formula described in the previous lemma, an
equivalent formula is obtained and the resulting theory is strongly equivalent to the initial one. We can repeat this process
for every function and constant to obtain the normal form described in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. For every formula ϕ , it is possible to build a formula ψ , such that ϕ ≡ ψ , and the atoms of ψ are of one of the following
types:
• x .= a for some a ∈ C,
• f (x1, . . . xn) .= y for some f ∈ F (where every xi and y are variables),
• p(x1, . . . , xm) (where each xi is a variable).
Proof. (Idea.) The formula ψ is constructed by successive applications of the equivalence in Lemma 1 to replace every atom
by an equivalent formula, starting from the innermost function or constant symbol in ϕ . 
The following example is taken from Enderton [47] and illustrates how this method works in a speciﬁc case:
∀x(p(a) → q( f (g(x)))) ≡ ∀x(∀y((y .= a) → p(y)) → q( f (g(x))))
≡ ∀x(∀y(y .= a → p(y)) → (g(x) .= y → q( f (y))))
≡ ∀x(∀y(y .= a → p(y)) → (g(x) .= y → (∀z( f (y) .= z → q(z))))).
4. Deﬁnability and interpretability
Our approach to synonymy uses the theory of deﬁnability and interpretations (between theories). In many respects it is
close to the classical theory found in logic textbooks, e.g. [47]. However, we need to adapt this theory to our underlying
non-classical logic and draw on metalogical properties of QHTs= . We start with some elements of deﬁnability theory.
Deﬁnition 3 (Explicit deﬁnability). Let L = 〈C, F , P 〉 be a ﬁrst-order language.
• Let p /∈ P be a new predicate symbol and Π a theory in L′ = 〈C, F , P ∪ {p}〉. The symbol p is said to be explicitly
deﬁnable in Π , if there is an L-formula δp(x) such that
Π | ∀x(p(x) ↔ δp(x)
)
.
δp is called the Defn of p.
• Let f /∈ F be a new function symbol and Π a theory in L′ = 〈C, F ∪ { f }, P 〉. The symbol f is said to be explicitly
deﬁnable in Π , if there is an L-formula δ f (x, y) such that
Π | ∀x∀y( f (x) .= y ↔ δ f (x, y)
)
.
δ f is called the Defn of f .
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in Π , if there is an L-formula δa(x) such that
Π | ∀x(a .= x↔ δa(x)
)
.
δa is called the Defn of a.
Deﬁnition 4 (Implicit deﬁnability). Let L′ be a language obtained from L by adding just one new predicate, function or
constant symbol, and let Π be a theory in L′ . The new symbol is said to be implicitly deﬁnable in Π if for any models M1
and M2 of Π such that M1|L = M2|L we have M1 = M2.
The strong completeness theorem for QHTs= and Proposition 4 allows us to conclude the following characterisation of
the implicit deﬁnability:
• A predicate p is implicitly deﬁnable in Π iff
Π ∪Π[p/q] | ∀x(p(x) ↔ q(x))
where q /∈ P is a new predicate symbol with the same arity as p and Π[p/q] is the theory obtained by replacing every
occurrence of p by q.
• Assuming that the formulas in Π are in the form described in Proposition 4, the function f is implicitly deﬁnable in Π
iff
Π ∪Π ′ ∪ ∀x∀y(q(x, y)∨¬q(x, y)) | ∀x( f (x) .= y ↔ q(x, y))
where q /∈ Π is a new predicate symbol with the same arity as f plus one, and Π ′ is built from Π by replacing every
atom f (x)
.= y by q(x, y).
In other words, p is implicitly deﬁnable if whenever the interpretation of the L predicates in models of Π is ﬁxed, the
interpretation of p becomes ﬁxed also; similarly for functions and constants. The above deﬁnitions are readily extended to
the case where several new predicate, function and constant symbols are deﬁnable in a theory.
When the conditions for explicit and implicit deﬁnability are always equivalent, the logic in question is said to have the
Beth property [48].
Proposition 5. The logic QHTs= possesses the Beth property.
Proof. The Beth property is closely related to the property of interpolation.16 It can be shown that the interpolation property
implies the Beth property in all superintuionistic predicate logics [48]. Moreover, Ono [49] showed that interpolation holds
in the logic QHTs of quantiﬁed here-and-there with constant domains.17 Consequently, QHTs also has the Beth property.
Lastly, Maksimova showed in [50,51] that adding pure equality axioms, e.g. decidable equality axiom, to any superintuition-
istic logic preserves the interpolation and Beth properties (see also [48]). Therefore from known results we can conclude that
QHTs= also possesses the Beth property. However, since these results are generally stated in the literature for function-free
languages, we need to adapt them to our present situation, as follows.
Let Π be a theory in L′ = 〈C, F ∪{ f }, P 〉. By Lemma 1, we can assume w.l.o.g. that the occurrences of f in Π are always
in atoms f (t)
.= y. Let p f /∈ P a new predicate symbol and Π ′ the theory in L′′ = 〈C, F , P ∪ {p f }〉 obtained by replacing the
atoms f (t)
.= y by p f (t, y) and
Π ′′ = Π ′ ∪ {∀x∃y∀z(p f (x, z) ↔ z .= y
)}
.
Trivially, there exists a bijection, Φ , between the models of Π ′′ and the models of Π , which is deﬁned using the following
relation:
p f (d1, . . . ,dn,dn+1) ∈ Ih iff I
(
f (d1, . . . ,dn)
) = dn+1.
To verify the Beth property, let us assume that f is explicitly deﬁnable in Π , then
Π | ∀x∀y( f (x) .= y ↔ δ f (x, y)
)
16 A logic is said to have the interpolation property if whenever  ϕ → ψ there exists a sentence ξ (the interpolant) such that  ϕ → ξ and  ξ → ψ
where all predicate and constant symbols of ξ are contained in both ϕ and ψ .
17 Ono’s axiomatisation of QHTs uses the constant domains axiom ∀x(α(x)∨ β) → (∀xα(x)∨ β), as well as alternative axioms for propositional here-and-
there, viz. p ∨ (p → (q ∨ ¬q)) and (p → q)∨ (q → p)∨ (p ↔ ¬q). However, the axioms given here are equivalent to Ono’s.
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Π ′′ | ∀x∀y(p f (x, y) ↔ δ f (x, y)
)
.
That is, δ f is a deﬁnition of p f and, by the Beth property already established for predicate symbols, p f is implicitly
deﬁnable. Let M1 and M2 two models of Π such that M1|L = M2|L; then Φ(M1)|L = Φ(M2)|L; by the Beth property,
Φ(M1) = Φ(M2) and thus M1 = M2.
The other direction of the Beth property is proved analogously. 
4.1. Interpretations between theories
Deﬁnition 5 (Interpretation between languages). Let L1 = 〈C1, F1, P1〉 and L2 = 〈C2, F2, P2〉 be disjoint languages.18 By an
interpretation τ of L1 in L2 we mean
1. for each predicate p ∈ P1, an L2-formula δτp such that the number of free variables in δτp is at most the arity of p;
2. for each constant a ∈ C1, an L2-formula δτa (x);
3. for each function f ∈ F1, an L2-formula δτf such that the number of free variables in δτf is at most the arity of p plus
one.
An interpretation τ , induces a mapping, also denoted by τ , from L1-formulas to L2-formulas: ﬁrst, a formula is con-
verted in the form described in Proposition 4 and then
1. τ (x
.= y) = x .= y,
2. τ ( f (x)
.= y) = δτf (x, y) for every function f ,
3. τ (a
.= x) = δτa (x), for every constant a,
4. τ (p(x)) = δτp (x),
5. τ is extended recursively by τ (ϕ ∧ ψ) = τ (ϕ) ∧ τ (ψ), τ (ϕ ∨ ψ) = τ (ϕ) ∨ τ (ψ), τ (ϕ → ψ) = τ (ϕ) → τ (ψ), τ (¬ϕ) =
¬τ (ϕ), τ (∀xϕ) = ∀xτ (ϕ) and τ (∃xϕ) = ∃xτ (ϕ).
Deﬁnition 6 (Induced deﬁnitions). For an interpretation τ , we deﬁne the set of deﬁnitions induced by τ as:
τ = {∀x(p(x) ↔ δτp (x)
)
, ∀y(a .= y ↔ δτa (y)
)
, ∀x∀y( f (x) .= y ↔ δτf (x, y)
)}
.
Deﬁnition 7 (Interpretation into a theory). If τ is an interpretation of L1 in L2 and Π2 is a theory in L2, τ is said to be an
interpretation of L1 in Π2 if the following conditions hold:
1. for every constant a ∈ C1,
Π2 | ∃x∀y
(
δτa (y) ↔ y .= x
); (4)
2. for every function f ∈ F1,
Π2 | ∀x∃y∀z
(
δτf (x, z) ↔ z .= y
)
. (5)
Any interpretation τ of L1 in Π2 induces a mapping Φτ from the set of models of Π2 to the set of L1-structures: if
I = 〈(D, I), Ih, It〉, then Φτ (I) = 〈(D, J ), J h, J t〉 is deﬁned as follows:
• for every a ∈ C1, J (a) = d if I | δτa (d);• for every f ∈ F1, f J (d1, . . . ,dn) = dn+1 if I | δτf (d1, . . . ,dn,dn+1);
• p(t) ∈ J w iff I,w | δτp (t), for every w ∈ {h, t}.
Lemma 2. The mapping Φτ is well deﬁned.
Proof. The condition (4) in the deﬁnition of interpretation guarantees that J is well deﬁned over the set of constants and
condition (5) guarantees that f J is well deﬁned for every f ∈ F1. 
18 Any languages can be made disjoint by renaming. Alternatively we can allow that L1 and L2 have a common sublanguage which any translations
simply leave untouched, i.e. the sublanguage is always translated by the identity map.
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Φτ (I),w | ϕ ⇔ I,w | τ (ϕ) (6)
and therefore
Φτ (I) | ϕ ⇔ I | τ (ϕ). (7)
Deﬁnition 8 (Interpretation between theories). Let L1 = 〈C1, F1, P1〉 and L2 = 〈C2, F2, P2〉 be disjoint languages and Π1 and
Π2 two theories in L1 and L2 respectively. An interpretation τ of L1 in Π2 is said to be an interpretation of Π1 in Π2 if
Π1 | ϕ ⇒ Π2 | τ (ϕ). (8)
For interpretations between theories, the mapping Φτ maps models of Π2 to models of Π1.
Proposition 6. Let τ be an interpretation of L1 in Π2 , and let Φτ be the induced map deﬁned above. Then τ is an interpretation of
Π1 in Π2 if and only if:
I | Π2 ⇒ Φτ (I) | Π1. (9)
Proof. (⇒) Let us assume that τ is an interpretation of Π1 in Π2 and I a model of Π2. If ϕ ∈ Π1, then Π1 | ϕ and, by (8),
Π2 | τ (ϕ); so, I is a model of τ (ϕ) and, by (7), Φτ (I) | ϕ . Therefore Φτ (I) | Π1.
(⇐) Let us assume (9), Π1 | ϕ and let I be a model of Π2. Then, by (9), Φτ (I) is a model of Π1 and thus it is a model
of ϕ; therefore, by (7), I is a model of τ (ϕ) and Π2 | τ (ϕ). 
Corollary 1. An interpretation τ of L1 in Π2 is an interpretation of Π1 in Π2 if and only if :
If I | Π2, then I | τ (ϕ) for all ϕ ∈ Π1.
Generally speaking the map Φτ associated with an interpretation τ of L1 in an L2-theory does not preserve the ordering
 between L2-structures. However the following properties are easy to check and will be useful later:
Lemma 3. Let τ be an interpretation of L1 in Π2 , and let Φτ be the induced map between structures. Let I be a total model of Π2 .
Then
(i) Φτ (I) is a total L1-structure; and
(ii) if I ′ | Π2 and I ′ I , then Φτ (I ′)Φτ (I).
Proof. (i) follows straightforwardly from (6): if Φτ (I) is a non-total L1-structure, then for some sentence ϕ , we have
Φτ (I), t | ϕ and Φτ (I),h | ϕ . By (6) therefore I, t | τ (ϕ) while I,h | τ (ϕ), contradicting the totality of I .
To prove (ii) let us consider a total structure I and I ′  I; then using (6) and the deﬁnition of  we have that for any
L1-formula ϕ ,
Φτ
(I ′), t | ϕ ⇔ I ′, t | τ (ϕ) ⇔ I, t | τ (ϕ) ⇔ Φτ (I), t | ϕ
and so Φτ (I ′) and Φτ (I) agree at their t points. On the other hand, by
Φτ
(I ′),h | ϕ ⇔ I ′,h | τ (ϕ) ⇒ I, t | τ (ϕ) ⇔ Φτ (I), t | ϕ
we obtain Φτ (I ′),h | ϕ ⇒ Φτ (I), t | ϕ and therefore Φτ (I ′)Φτ (I), since I is total. 
Deﬁnition 9 (Faithful interpretation). An interpretation τ of Π1 in Π2 is said to be faithful if the converse of (8) also holds,
i.e. we have
Π1 | ϕ ⇔ Π2 | τ (ϕ). (10)
As in classical interpretability theory, further special cases of interpretation can be obtained by imposing additional
conditions on the syntactic and semantic translations.
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(i) For every L2-formula ψ(x) there is an L1-formula ϕ(x) such that Π2 | ∀x(ψ(x) ↔ τ (ϕ(x))); i.e. τ is surjective.
(ii) There is an interpretation σ of L2 in L1 such that for every L2-formula ψ(x), Π2 | ∀x(ψ(x) ↔ τ (σ (ψ(x)))); σ is called the
inverse of τ .
(iii) The mapping Φτ from models of Π2 into models of Π1 is an injection.
Proof. (ii) implies (i) is straightforward.
(i) implies (iii) is also easy: let I1 and I2 be two models of Π2 such that Φτ (I1) = Φτ (I2); let p(t) be a basic atom in
L2 and ϕ(t) an L1-formula such that Π2 | p(t) ↔ τ (ϕ(t)),
I1,w | p(t) ⇔ I1,w | τ
(
ϕ(t)
) (
because I1 | p(t) ↔ τ
(
ϕ(t)
))
⇔ Φτ (I1),w | ϕ(t)
⇔ Φτ (I2),w | ϕ(t)
(
because Φτ (I1) = Φτ (I2)
)
⇔ I2,w | τ
(
ϕ(t)
)
⇔ I2,w | p(t)
(
because I2 | p(t) ↔ τ
(
ϕ(t)
))
.
All of this is valid even if p(t) = f (s) .= a, and thus we can conclude that f I1 = f I2 for every f . Therefore I1 = I2 and Φτ
is injective.
To show that (iii) implies (ii), one applies the Beth property. First, we shall show that in L2 ∪ L1 the theory Π = Π2 ∪ τ
implicitly deﬁnes the atoms of L2: let M1 and M2 be two models of Π such that M1|L1 = M2|L1 ; to prove that
M1 = M2, we only need to prove that M1|L2 = M2|L2 :
• By Proposition 1, the restrictions M1|L2 and M2|L2 are models of Π2.• For every atomic formula p(x), M1 | ∀x(p(x) ↔ δτp (x)); so, for every vector t of constants in C1, M1,w | p(t)
iff M1,w | τ (p(t)), and therefore M1|L1 ,w | p(t) iff M1|L2 ,w | τ (p(t)). Analogously, M2|L1 ,w | p(t) iff
M2|L2 ,w | τ (p(t)).• Φτ (M1|L2 ) = Φτ (M2|L2 ): if p(t) is an atomic sentence of L1 and w ∈ {h, t}, then
Φτ (M1|L2),w | p(t) ⇔ M1|L2 ,w | τ
(
p(t)
)
, from (6)
⇔ M1|L1 ,w | p(t), previous item
⇔ M2|L1 ,w | p(t), by hypothesis
⇔ M2|L2 ,w | τ
(
p(t)
)
, previous item
⇔ Φτ (M2|L2),w | p(t), from (6).
• Thus M1|L2 = M2|L2 , for Φτ is injective; therefore M1 = M2 and Π deﬁnes implicitly the vocabulary of L2.
Using the Beth property, we deduce that Π deﬁnes explicitly the predicates, the constants and the functions of L2, i.e. there
exists an interpretation σ of L2 in L1 such that:
Π | ∀x(q(x) ↔ δσq (x)
)
,
Π | ∀x(x .= a ↔ δσa (x)
)
,
Π | ∀x∀y( f (x) .= y ↔ δσf (x, y)
)
. (11)
Now, we can establish claim (ii). Let M be a model of Π2 and let us consider the extension to the language L1∪L2 deﬁned
by M+,w | p(t) iff M,w | τ (p(t)); so M+ is a model of Π and, by (11), it is also a model of every deﬁnition and thus,
for every basic atom q(t) in L2 and w ∈ {h, t},
M,w | q(t) ⇔ M+,w | q(t)
⇔ M+,w | δσq (t), by (11)
⇔ M,w | τ (δσq (t)
)
, by deﬁnition of M+ and induction.
By induction, for every L2-formula ψ(x), we deduce that M,w | ψ(t) ↔ τ (σ (ψ(t))) and therefore M | ∀x(ψ(x) ↔
τ (σ (ψ(x)))). 
An interpretation satisfying any of (i)–(iii) of Proposition 7 is said to be surjective. Such interpretations preserve the
property of being an equilibrium model, in the following sense.
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then M is an equilibrium model of Π2 .
Proof. Since τ is surjective, the map Φτ is an injection of Π2 models into Π1 models. Applying the deﬁnition of equilibrium
and Lemma 3 establishes the result. 
5. Synonymy and equivalence
We are now ready to consider our main concept. An interpretation τ that is both surjective and faithful is said to be a
bijective interpretation of Π1 in Π2.
Deﬁnition 10 (Synonymy). If there exists a bijective interpretation τ of Π1 in Π2 (i.e. a surjective and faithful interpretation),
we say that Π1 is synonymous with Π2 with respect to τ .
It is easy to verify that if τ is a bijective interpretation of Π1 in Π2, then its inverse interpretation σ is an interpretation
of Π2 in Π1 and it is also bijective. In fact we have:
Theorem 2. Synonymy is an equivalence relation.
Proof.
• Reﬂexivity is trivial using τ = id.
• To prove symmetry, let us consider a bijective interpretation τ of Π1 in Π2 and its inverse interpretation σ of L2 in
L1; to conclude symmetry it is enough to prove that σ is an interpretation of Π2 in Π1 and that it is also bijective:
– To prove that σ is an interpretation of L2 in Π1 we must check the conditions (4) and (5) for σ . Let a be a constant
of L2; applying the condition (ii) of Proposition 7 to the formula ψ(x) = x .= a we have
Π2 | ∀y
(
y
.= a ↔ τ (δσa (y)
))
and thus
Π2 | ∃x∀y
(
y
.= x↔ τ (δσa (y)
))
.
Then, by the faithfulness of τ ,
Π1 | ∃x∀y
(
y
.= x↔ δσa (y)
)
,
which is the condition (4) for σ . Condition (5) can be proved analogously.
– σ is an interpretation of Π2 in Π1 and it is faithful:
Π1 | σ(ϕ) ⇔ Π2 | τ
(
σ(ϕ)
)
(because τ is faithful)
⇔ Π2 | ϕ
(
from Proposition 7 (ii) applied to τ
)
.
– σ is surjective: in particular, we can verify condition (ii) in Proposition 7 where τ is the inverse of σ :
Π2 | ∀x
(
τ
(
ϕ(x)
) ↔ τ (σ (τ (ϕ(x))))) ⇒ Π2 | τ
(∀x(ϕ(x) ↔ σ (τ (ϕ(x)))))
⇒ Π1 | ∀x
(
ϕ(x) ↔ σ (τ (ϕ(x)))).
• Let us consider a bijective interpretation τ1 of Π1 in Π2 and a bijective interpretation τ2 of Π2 in Π3. To establish
transitivity, we are going to prove that τ2 ◦ τ1 is a bijective interpretation of Π1 in Π3.
– τ2 ◦ τ1 is an interpretation of Π1 in Π3 and it is faithful because τ1 and τ2 are:
Π1 | ϕ ⇔ Π2 | τ1(ϕ) ⇔ Π3 | τ2
(
τ1(ϕ)
)
.
– τ2 ◦ τ1 is surjective: in particular, Φτ1 ◦ Φτ2 veriﬁes condition (iii) in Proposition 7, because Φτ2 and Φτ1 are injec-
tions. 
Proposition 9. If τ is a bijective interpretation of Π1 in Π2 then the mapping Φτ is a one-one correspondence between models of Π1
and models of Π2 .
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readily seen that Φσ (Φτ (M)) = M if M is a model of Π2; however equality need not hold for other structures (outside
of the class of Π2-models), even in the case of classical logic. So in general Π2 need not be logically equivalent to τ (Π1).
To see this consider the following example. Let Π1 be a theory in the signature comprising just the unary predicate p
and let be Π2 be a theory in the unary predicates p,q. Suppose that Π1 has no axioms and Π2 has the single axiom
∀x(p(x) ↔ q(x)). Then we can interpret Π1 in Π2 by the identity interpretation τ and Π2 in Π1 by interpreting p and q as
p. This is clearly a synonymy. However τ (Π1) comprises just the tautologies in p. So it cannot prove ∀x(p(x) ↔ q(x)).
5.1. Verifying the adequacy conditions
Let us now consider synonymy in light of the adequacy conditions D1–D6. We have already dealt with the basic cases of
translation and associated semantic correspondence. Let us now consider the sense in which two synonymous theories can
be considered equivalent as in requirement D3.
Proposition 10. Let Π1 and Π2 be synonymous w.r.t. τ and σ . Then Π2 ∪ τ is strongly equivalent with Π1 ∪ σ . Thus Π1 and Π2
have a common deﬁnitional extension, i.e. there is a theory Π in L2 ∪ L1 , such that Π2 ∪ τ ≡ Π1 ∪ σ ≡ Π .
Proof. By Theorem 1, it is enough to prove that Π2 ∪ τ and Π1 ∪σ have the same models. Let M a model of Π2 ∪ τ . From
M | ∀x(p(x) ↔ δτp (x)) it is easy to conclude by induction that
M | ϕ ⇔ M | τ (ϕ) (12)
for every L1 ∪ L2-sentence. By the deﬁnition of interpretation, M | τ (ϕ), for every ϕ ∈ Π1 and thus M | ϕ for every
ϕ ∈ Π1, i.e. M | Π1.
On the other hand, by item (ii) in Proposition 7 applied to τ , M | ∀x(q(x) ↔ τ (δσq (x))) for all q ∈ P2, and thus, for every
vector t of constants in C2, M | q(t) iff M | τ (δσq (t)), and iff M | δσq (t), by (12). Therefore M | ∀x(q(x) ↔ δσq (x)).
The proof of Π1 ∪ σ | Π2 ∪ τ is similar. 
In fact Proposition 10 can be strengthened to an equivalence: two theories are bijectively interpretable if and only if
they have a common deﬁnitional extension. This expresses one way in which the two theories are in an obvious sense
equivalent once enriched with suitable translation manuals. Notice too that there is a close relationship between Π2 and
the translation τ (Π1) of Π1 (similarly between Π1 and the translation σ(Π2) of Π2). It is already clear that Π2 | τ (Π1).
Although it is not generally true, even in the classical case, that Π2 ≡ τ (Π1), we do however have:
Corollary 2. Let Π1 and Π2 be synonymous w.r.t. τ and σ . For any L2-formula ϕ , Π2 | ϕ ↔ τσ (ϕ), and Π2 | ϕ ⇒ τ (Π1) |
τσ (ϕ).
Next we turn to condition D4.
Proposition 11. Let Π1 and Π2 be theories in L1 and L2 respectively, synonymous w.r.t. τ and σ . Then the bijective mapping Φτ
from models of Π2 to models of Π1 preserves the equilibrium property, i.e. M |∼Π2 iff Φτ (M) |∼Π1 .
Proof. Using Proposition 8, we only need to prove that if M is an equilibrium model of Π2 then Φτ (M) is also in
equilibrium. Let us assume that Φτ (M) is a model of Π1 that is not in equilibrium. So there is M′Φτ (M) with M′ | Π1.
Since Φτ (Φσ (M′)) = M′ , by Lemma 3, Φσ (M′) is not total since M′ is not total, and Φσ (M′)Φσ (Φτ (M)) = M which
contradicts the equilibrium property of M. 
Clearly, condition D5 is satisﬁed and the presence of an inverse interpretation provides the sense in which the corre-
spondence between Π1 and Π2 is idempotent. Lastly we consider D6.
Proposition 12. Let Π1 and Π2 be theories in L1 and L2 respectively synonymous w.r.t. τ and σ . Let Π a set of L1-formulas. Then
Π1 ∪Π is synonymous with Π2 ∪ τ (Π) w.r.t. τ and σ .
Proof. Assume the hypotheses of the proposition. If Π1 ∪ Π | ϕ and M | Π2 ∪ τ (Π), then Φτ (M) | Π1 and
Φτ (M) | Π ; thus Φτ (M) | ϕ and M | τ (ϕ). Therefore τ is an interpretation of Π1 ∪ Π in Π2 ∪ τ (Π). Next we show
that τ is faithful, that is that
Π2 ∪ τ (Π) | τ (ϕ) ⇒ Π1 ∪Π | ϕ.
Now suppose that Π2 ∪ τ (Π) | τ (ϕ) and M | Π1 ∪ Π . By assumption, M = Φσ (Φτ (M)). Since σ is an interpretation
of Π2 in Π1, and M | Π , Φσ (M) | τ (Π) and Φσ (M) | Π2. Therefore Φσ (M) | τ (ϕ), M | σ(τ (ϕ)) and M | ϕ .
Finally Φτ is injective over the set of models of Π2 and therefore over the set of models of Π2 ∪ τ (Π). So τ is a bijective
interpretation of Π1 ∪Π onto Π2 ∪ τ (Π). 
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To illustrate how our concepts can be applied in practice, we look at an example taken from causal action theory. This is a
real application scenario where problems of equivalence arise in practice. The case study comes from [19] where Balduccini
and Gelfond propose an architecture for a software agent that operates a physical device and is capable of monitoring,
testing and repairing the device’s components. Based on the theory described in a suitable action language, they present
simpliﬁed deﬁnitions of several notions, such as symptom and diagnosis, in such a way that it is possible to give a simple
account of the agent’s behaviour in which many of the agent’s tasks are reduced to computing the stable models of logic
programs. We choose here the program built by the authors to ﬁnd candidate diagnoses using answer set programming; to
do that, a System Description of a Diagnostic Domain and a speciﬁc history is given. We only include here a short and informal
description, for detailed explanations the reader should consult the referred paper [19].
We call L2 the language used in [19] and we use Π2 to denote our rendering of the program described in Section 4
of [19]. The language includes the natural numbers and the successor function; additionally, among the constants, we have
a set of actions, a set of laws, a set of ﬂuents and a function over the set of ﬂuents:  is the negation of the ﬂuent . Several
predicates are used to ﬁx the speciﬁc role of every constant and the basic relations among them:
d_law(d) (d is a dynamic causal law),
s_law(d) (d is a static causal law),
head(d, l0) (every law d has assigned a list of ﬂuents and l0 is the head),
action(d,a) (the law d speciﬁes the effects of action a).
The ﬂuents and the actions occur in speciﬁc instants and some predicates express that:
holds(l,n) (the ﬂuent l holds at instant n),
obs(l,n) (the ﬂuent l was observed to be true at moment n),
hpd(a,n) (the action a was observed to happen at moment n),
o(a,n) (the action a occurs at moment n).
Two relations, hpd and o, are used to distinguish between actions observed and actions hypothesised respectively.
We re-write the rules of [19] as logical formulas separated by commas, understood to be universally closed (we omit the
quantiﬁers for simplicity). Some formulas are included in order to describe the effects of causal laws and constraints, some
establish the relationship between observations and the basic relations, and guarantee that observations do not contradict
the agent’s expectations. The ﬁfth formula rules out inconsistent states.
Π0 =
{¬(holds(l1, x)∧ · · · ∧ holds(lm, x)∧ o(a, x)
)
,
(
d_law(x)∧ head(x, y)∧ action(x, z)∧ o(z,u)∧ prec_h(x,u)) → holds(y,u + 1),
(
s_law(x)∧ head(x, y)∧ prec_h(x, z)) → holds(y, z),
(
holds(y, z)∧¬holds(y, z + 1)) → holds(y, z + 1),
¬(holds(y, z)∧ holds(y, z)),
hpd(x, y) → o(x, y),
obs(y,0) → holds(y,0),
¬(obs(y, z)∧¬holds(y, z))} ∪ SD
where the set SD includes the atoms d_law(d), action(d,a), s_law(d′), head(d, l0), action(d,a) determined by the laws,
actions and ﬂuents deﬁning the Description System, and prec_h is an auxiliary predicate which will be deﬁned later.
The program Π0 does not yet include the rules that we want to focus on in our example; in fact we consider the
program Π2 given by
Π2 = Π0 ∪
{
prec_rei(d,1, l1), . . . , prec_rei(d,m, lm),
(
prec_rei(x,u, v)∧ holds(v, z)∧ all_h(x,u + 1, z)) → all_h(x,u, z),
all_h
(
x,np(x) + 1, z),
all_h(x,1, z) → prec_h(x, z)}.
The goal of these additional rules is to deﬁne the relation prec_h: for every law d, the atom prec_h(d, x) says that all the
preconditions of d are satisﬁed at moment x. This relation is deﬁned via an auxiliary relation all_h(d, i, t) which holds if the
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nth precondition of d is l and the function np(d) that returns the number of preconditions of the law d and its interpretation
is ﬁxed.
Michael Gelfond has suggested the following problem.19 We know that it is also possible to manage the preconditions
of a law using lists, though these are not available in most answer set solvers. Alternatively we can use the formulation
without lists. The problem is to prove that both representation are equivalent.
We are going to introduce the alternative representation as a new theory Π1 in a language L1 and then use the syn-
onymy theory to answer the question. To approach this problem we consider a language L1 that only differs from L2 with
respect to two predicates: hold(x, y)20 and prec(x, y) will be used to deﬁne prec_h instead of all_h(x, y, z), prec_num(x, y)
and prec_rei(x, y, z). In the theory Π1 we will use the standard functions and predicates necessary to work with lists; we
assume that these functions and predicates are available in L1 and in L2; moreover, we suppose that both theories include
the necessary rules to deﬁne these predicates. So, nil denotes the empty lists and cons(x, y) is the list with head x and
tail y. The predicate nth(n, , x) is read as “the nth term of  is x”; the predicate member(x, ) is read as “x is a member
of ”; the predicate length(,n) is read as “n is the length of ”; the predicate append(1, 2, 3) is read as “3 is the
concatenation of 1 and 2”. In the following theory,  denotes the list [l1, . . . , lm]
Π1 = Π0 ∪
{
hold(nil, x),
(
holds(x, y)∧ hold(z, y)) → hold(cons(x, z), y),
(
prec(x, y)∧ hold(y, z)) → prec_h(x, z)}.
Here, we use the predicate hold([l1 . . . ln], x) to say that every precondition in the list [l1 . . . ln] holds at instant x and
prec(d, [l1 . . . ln]) to say that the preconditions of d are [l1 . . . ln].
Intuitively, the deﬁnitions of prec_h provided by the two programs Π2 and Π1 are essentially the same; but there is
no standard technique in ASP to establish this. The theory of synonymy developed in this paper allows us to address this
problem and provide a formal solution. Notice that we regard all the vocabulary that is common to the two programs as
having the same meaning in each. So their translations are based on the identity map and are left implicit here. We only
deal explicitly with the translation of those predicates that differ in L1 and L2. Speciﬁcally, we can deﬁne an interpretation
τ of L1 to L2 by:
prec(x, y) ↔ ∀u∀v(nth(u, y, v) → prec_rei(x,u, v)),
hold(x, y) ↔ ∀u(member(u, x) → holds(u, y)).
In addition, there is an interpretation σ of L2 to L1 deﬁned by:
prec_rei(x, y, z) ↔ ∃u(nth(y,u, z)∧ prec(x,u)),
all_h(x, y, z) ↔ ∃u∃v∃w(prec(x,u)∧ length(w, y − 1)∧ append(w, v,u) ∧ hold(v, z)).
To prove that τ is an interpretation of Π1 in Π2, we must check that if I is a model of Π2 then I is a model of τ (ϕ)
for every ϕ ∈ Π1. We give the details for some formulas:
• τ (prec(d, )) = ∀x∀y(nth(x, , y) → prec_rei(d, x, y)). If I is a model of Π2, then, necessarily nth(i, , li), with i =
1, . . . ,n, are just the atoms with predicate nth and the list  in the central argument that are valid in I , and
I | prec_rei(d, i, li) for every i = 1, . . . ,m; therefore, I | ∀x∀y(nth(x, , y) → prec_rei(d, x, y)).
• τ ((prec(x, y)∧ hold(y, z)) → prec_h(x, z)) =
= (∀v∀u(nth(u, y, v) → prec_rei(x,u, v)) ∧ ∀v(member(v, y) → holds(v, z))) → prec_h(x, z)
≡ ∀v∀u((nth(u, y, v) → prec_rei(x,u, v)) ∧ (member(v, y) → holds(v, z))) → prec_h(x, z).
This formula is trivially valid if y ranges from the set of lists of preconditions and thus we can assume that y =
[v1, . . . , vm] and the formula becomes equivalent to
((
prec_rei(x,1, v1)∧ holds(v1, z)
) ∧ · · · ∧ (prec_rei(x,m, vm)∧ holds(vm, z)
)) → prec_h(x, z),
where m = np(x). This formula can be deduced from Π2; moreover, it could be easily deduced from the following
subset:
19 In a personal communication to the authors.
20 Notice that the hold predicate is distinct from the holds predicate.
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all_h
(
x,np(x) + 1, z),
(
prec_rei(x,u, v)∧ holds(v, z)∧ all_h(x,u + 1, z)) → all_h(x,u, z),
all_h(x,1, z) → prec_h(x, z)}.
The proof of the faithfulness condition for τ is similar. Finally, the interpretation τ is surjective because it veriﬁes condition
(iii) in Proposition 7. This is easy to prove by considering that the translation τ ◦ σ is
prec_rei(x, y, z) ↔ ∃u(nth(y,u, z)∧ ∀z∀v(nth(z,u, v) → prec_rei(x, z, v))),
all_h(x, y, z) ↔ ∃u∃v∃w(∀v∀w(nth(v,u,w) → prec_rei(x, v,w)) ∧ length(w, y − 1)∧ append(w, v,u)
∧ ∀w(member(w, v) → holds(w, z)))
and the rule nth(x, y, z) →member(z, y) is included in both theories.
7. Discussion: what synonymy is not
Our approach to synonymy has been to try and capture a strong or robust notion of equivalence for programs and
theories expressed in different vocabularies. We can regard this equivalence as amounting to a “sameness of meaning”. It
is important to point out, however, that this kind of equivalence does not mean equality in all aspects. Since the semantic
correspondence between synonymous theories preserves the equilibrium property in both directions, such theories will
always produce equivalent answers to equivalent queries. In this sense they are the essentially same. But they may differ in
many other respects. In ASP nonmonotonic inference can be of either skeptical or credulous kind. The latter is appropriate
in cases where each answer set represents a problem solution, the former in cases where we are interested in derivability in
all answer sets. In either case, synonymous theories will yield equivalent answers. For instance if we denote the collection
of equilibrium models of a theory Π by ModE(Π), then Π entails ϕ in the skeptical sense, in symbols Π |∼ ϕ , if M | ϕ ,
for all M ∈ ModE (Π). So if Π1 and Π2 are synonymous w.r.t. τ and σ , we have
Π1 |∼ ϕ ⇔ Π2 |∼ τ (ϕ),
and analogously for σ . A similar relation holds for credulous inference, so in general we can claim that
• Synonymous theories yield equivalent answers to equivalent queries.
In KRR contexts in other words, synonymous theories will produce equivalent plans, diagnoses, explanations, and so forth.
However from an operational or practical point of view synonymous theories may differ. We saw in the introduction
how one might prefer one representation to another, equivalent one, with regard to computational eﬃciency, elaboration
tolerance, or other grounds of simplicity and eﬃciency. This is not surprising. Even strongly equivalent theories in the same
language need not be equally simple or eﬃcient in computational terms.
An interesting area for future study is the way in which different kinds of interpretability or synonymy relations preserve
properties, including computational properties, of the theories and their models. In the case of interpretations in classical
logic, many results are known (see e.g. [36]). Typical observations are that surjective interpretations τ preserve the ele-
mentary equivalence of models, while deﬁnitions τ of a special syntactic kind can preserve properties like homomorphisms
between models. We do not yet have comparable results in the setting of ASP. However we may conjecture that interpreta-
tions preserving the -relation between structures could be relevant in some cases for the transfer of certain computational
properties from one theory to another.21
8. Literature and related work
In classical logic there is a large and well-developed body of work on interpretability dating from the 1950s. The ﬁrst
systematic treatments of synonymous theories in this context can be found in [53,35], a more algebraic approach can be
found in [54]. The classical version of Proposition 7 is essentially contained in [53], though a more detailed statement
and proof can be found in [36]. In our approach we have partly followed the style of Pinter in [36], however that paper
does not give an adequate account of the translation of expressions with function symbols. Good textbook treatments
of interpretability can be found in [47,55]. Outside the ﬁeld of mathematics, the classical theory of interpretability and
deﬁnitional equivalence was extended and applied to empirical forms of knowledge in [56,33,32]; see also [34] for a more
recent account of translatability issues in such contexts. The theory of interpretations and equivalence in non-classical logics
is less developed, however especially in the case of superintuitionistic logics much is known about key properties, such as
interpolation and Beth, on which interpretability theory depends, see e.g. [50,51,57]. In the context of nonmonotonic logic
21 This is related to the fact that for logic programs some syntactic classes can be characterised relative to others in terms of properties of the -
relation [52].
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Until now the case of programs in different languages has only been considered in [31]. There has been some discussion of
the role and properties of deﬁnitions in ASP in [58,59].
9. Concluding remarks
We have shown how formal approaches to intertheory relations developed for mathematical and scientiﬁc knowledge
can be applied to systems of logic programming and nonmonotonic reasoning used for practical problem solving and knowl-
edge representation. In particular, we have described how the theory of interpretability and deﬁnitional equivalence can be
applied in the context of ﬁrst-order logic programs under answer set semantics and nonmonotonic theories in the system
of quantiﬁed equilibrium logic. In this setting we regard theories as synonymous if each is bijectively interpretable in the
other, and we have characterised this relation in different ways. We also showed that this reconstruction satisﬁes a number
of intuitive, informal adequacy conditions.
Our approach should be directly applicable to all the usual systems of ASP as well as specialised languages such as
action languages built on them. In addition our general method should be transferable to other knowledge representation
formalisms based on logic. Speciﬁc characterisations of synonymy will depend on the logics concerned and their metalogical
properties.
The applicability of what is essentially a classical logical approach in a non-classical context relies on two essential
features: ﬁrst, our underlying logic has several properties such as Beth that help to relate the syntax to the semantics of
deﬁnitions and translations; secondly, in ASP and equilibrium logic the strong concept of equivalence between theories is
fully captured in the underlying monotonic logic (quantiﬁed here-and-there). This allows us to deﬁne a robust or modular
concept of equivalence across different languages.
Several avenues are left open for future exploration. For example, one might want to study other kinds of interpretability
relations, such as where the formula δτp deﬁning a predicate p may contain additional parameters, or where the semantic
mapping Φτ may relate models with different domains. Secondly, one might search for simple structural properties on the
models of two programs or theories that are equivalent to or suﬃcient for synonymy. Thirdly, based on these or other
properties of the theories concerned, it would be useful to develop systems for checking synonymy, thereby extending
current methods for checking strong equivalence in the case of programs in the same language [28,26].
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